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Review Essay
Tales of Humanitarian Intervention Gone Awry
The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas
and Practice from the Nineteenth Century to the
Present
Fabian Klose (ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
364pp.

The Conceit of Humanitarian Intervention
Rajan Menon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 235pp.

Richard Falk *
Ever since manitarianthe fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet
Union there has been an upsurge of international undertakings that have claimed
humanitarian justifications for military interventions in foreign societies. A second kind
of justification for such interventions all of which are launched by Western countries
(especially the United States) was associated in this period with the global “war on
terror” initiated during the presidency of George W. Bush in response to the 9/11 attacks
of 2001 on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In other words, this upsurge in
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interventions draws partly on a normative rationale drawn from religion, morality, and
law and partly from a security rationale premised on stretching the law of self-defense to
meet the distinctive challenge of transnational mega-terrorism. The central question
raised is whether this contemporary practice of intervention has been beneficial from the
perspective of either humanitarianism or security.
There are some crucial considerations that bear on the use of force given the
hybrid structure of world order as partly state-centric and partly geopolitical. The statecentric part is, by and large, anti-interventionist seeking to safeguard the autonomy of
territorial sovereign states based on ideas of juridical equality embedded in the rule of
law. The geopolitical part is, by and large, interventionist as a reflection of the
international reality that only the more powerful states possess the capabilities and the
geopolitical ambition to intervene. As might be expected these two dimensions of world
order are often in tension when concrete cases arise. For geopolitical actors that are also
states the two ordering principles are reconciled by privileging sovereignty for oneself
and maintaining an option to intervene with respect to all other states except those that
are themselves geopolitical actors.
One way to resolve this underlying tension is to condition humanitarian
intervention on a grant of authority by the UN Security Council (UNSC). However, the
UNSC is structured in such a way that only when the dominant members, the permanent
five or P-5, are in agreement can an authorizing decision be reached. And even on those
rare occasions when such authorization is forthcoming as was the case with the First Gulf
War of 1991 or the 2013 NATO intervention against the Qaddafi government in Libya,
the UN loses any capacity to supervise what has been authorized because operational
control is taken over by the geopolitical actor(s) delegated to use force. In this sense, the
tension between statism and geopolitics is not overcome by reliance on the UN even
when it is capable of reaching a decision, but merely somewhat disguised. In essence,
whenever an intervention occurs, its contours are controlled by geopolitics despite UN
authorization and reliance on a humanitarian rationale. Further, the UN is too weak to
insist that an intervention be confined to humanitarian ends, and geopolitical actors are
not willing to intervene militarily unless they possess strategic and self-interested reasons
for doing so.
Against this background it is a pleasure to welcome two excellent books that
explore the ins and outs of humanitarian intervention, arriving at the essentially
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convergent and unsurprising conclusion that such behavior is more a geopolitical than a
normative phenomenon. The Klose edited collection is generally analytic and empirical
in tone, with several strong historical chapters, while Menon’s book is a tightly argued
polemic directed against those liberal internationalists who during the Obama presidency
have championed the dawn of a new era of humanitarian intervention resting on the
implementation of universally shared values.
The contrary thesis of Menon’s book is conveyed by his title, The Conceit of
Humanitarian Intervention. In effect, he is instructing us on the basis of a very
scrupulous consideration of doctrine, cases, and results that claims by the West,
especially by the United States, to have engaged in a series of “humanitarian
interventions” is a snare and delusion, with a shabby record of performance. Menon
associates the word ‘conceit’ with its dictionary definition of “a fanciful idea” that
embodies an “excessive appreciation of one’s own opinion or worth.” As applied to the
controversies about humanitarian intervention, Menon insists that advocates so greatly
exaggerate “the worldwide spread of universal norms and their acceptance by the
international community” as to make their argument “little more than a conceit” (10). In a
rhetorical flourish Menon tells his readers that “[h]umanitarian interventionists are
intoxicated by the grandeur and moralism of their transformative program” (178).
Menon develops his case carefully, accurately presenting the arguments with
which he disagrees, with his main targets obviously being the liberal internationalists
who pushed Barack Obama to intervene in a series of countries in the Middle East with
disastrous results. In this regard, it happens to be three influential women—Hilary
Clinton, Susan Rice, and Samantha Power—who have been most prominently carrying
the torch of humanitarian intervention during the Obama presidency. Menon does not
doubt their sincerity, but he is highly critical of their tendency to separate an affirmation
of humanitarian goals from any acknowledgement of the relevance of geopolitical
motivations and complications.
As he points out, by neglecting the difficulties of achieving the posited
humanitarian goals, the weakness of a humanitarian rationale for the use of force is
ignored, and disappointing results ensue. Menon points out that sovereign states are
deeply reluctant to sacrifice their own citizens for the purpose of promoting positive
humanitarian results. Equally discrediting is the startling failures of intervening states to
invest sufficiently and effectively in post-intervention reconstruction, thereby leaving in
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ruins what they were pledged to fix. As the persisting chaos in Iraq and Libya vividly
illustrates, the fact that a dictatorial and abusive regime was replaced does not insure that
a society will be better off as a result of the intervention. Especially in Iraq, there is every
reason to suppose that the war planners in the Pentagon and the State Department would
quietly rejoice if a new strong man emerged who proved capable of imposing order in the
manner of Saddam Hussein. In this sense, one of the implicit caveats of the Menon
critique is “beware of what you wish for.” In effect, he shows that more often than not,
the unintended consequences of intervention create new monsters more formidable than
those destroyed. Perhaps, this point can be driven home by pointing out that the
American intervention in Iraq led to the formation of ISIS, and its later spread to a series
of other countries, including Libya.
Menon also questions the normative argument from two main angles. First of
all, he believes that disagreements among major states generally prevent any consensus
being formed as to the application of humanitarian norms. And further, that many states
in the post-colonial global setting are very reluctant to endorse any right of the West to
override sovereignty by way of military intervention. In this regard he views the
pretensions of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm with a suspicious eye. The
abstractness and vagueness of the norm allows states to interpret its meaning in very selfserving ways, which ensures that its role in conflict situations will be more a reflection of
geopolitics than of normative agreement. In Menon’s words “[h]umanitarian intervention
can never become an ethically driven pursuit disentangled from power and interests”
(11). This assessment rests on Menon’s underlying embrace of realism as the foundation
of political behavior involving international uses of force: “Great powers seldom, if ever,
surrender their privileges for the greater good” (159). Supposing here that the greater
good is the prevention of mass atrocities by demonic governments, Menon is saying that
normative considerations to the extent invoked serve as window dressing, and will not
generate meaningful action unless reinforced by an accompanying geopolitical motive of
sufficient magnitude.
Although Menon does not make the argument, the refusal of liberal democratic
states to act collectively to prevent the Nazi persecution of Jews and others is a dramatic
confirmation of his underlying argument about the structure of international political life.
His main effort is to discredit the liberal claim that after the fall of the Soviet Union there
existed a broad humanitarian movement in international society that generated a strong
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enough headwind to uphold the contention that atrocities could be prevented and
punished through the instrumentalities of humanitarian intervention and R2P. I believe
Menon brilliantly explicates the several fallacies of the interventionists, while at the same
time keeping the door open for intervention in reaction to atrocities when geopolitical
forces are effectively aligned and the likely costs realistically taken into account.
With respect to costs, Menon exhibits further well-reasoned skepticism. He
shows that throughout history, those who favored the use of force understated the costs
and difficulties of proposed undertakings. In this sense, it is not only that humanitarians
are naïve in their enthusiasm but also that the militarists (often the politicians rather than
the professional military) view intervention threw rose-tinted glasses. Recent experience
that confirms the immense difficulties of turning the military superiority enjoyed by an
intervening state or coalition of the willing into the desired political outcome. This
realization alone should give rise to a posture of caution and restraint when it comes to
embarking on any military intervention.
Menon sustains his narrow critique of humanitarian intervention with lucid
analysis and a scholarly mastery of relevant materials. There are a few red lines he
refuses to cross. There is not a single mention of Israel/Palestine, and the prolonged
plight of the civilian population of Gaza, nor is there any insight given as to what could
be done to protect the people of Syria from the horrifying spectacle of atrocity. Although
Menon advocates a kind of pragmatism in shaping responses, he does not discuss the
complicity of geopolitical actors in crimes against humanity, genocide. As well, there is
no reference to the relevance of neoliberal globalization to decisions bearing on whether
to intervene or not.
The Klose volume manages a consistently high quality throughout its fifteen
chapters, but it is much harder to review. The book lacks the coherence and focus of the
Menon effort. If there is a common theme it is this idea of impurity when it comes to
military intervention. In an introductory chapter Klose adopts a strong formulation of this
view: “if the purity of humanitarian purposes is the sole criterion defining the concept of
humanitarian intervention, then it never existed and will never exist. It is an absolute
myth that states would risk or have ever risked the lives of their soldiers just to follow the
altruistic call of humanity” (13). While Menon devotes his energy to those who are
claiming that intervention for humanitarian purposes has become possible and is
desirable, the Klose contributors, mainly Europeans, are trying to set forth the mixed
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motives that color many shades of gray when appraising the main instances of
humanitarian intervention throughout modern history dating back to the struggle to stop
the international slave trade.
There are two contributions of this historical approach to our understanding of
humanitarian intervention. The first is to affirm the degree to which past claims of
humanitarian intervention were always covering over geopolitical priorities that alone
explained why, for instance, Christians were protected if abused in the declining decades
of the Ottoman Empire while the victimization of other minorities was ignored. The
second it to deepen our historical awareness in ways that stress continuity with the past
rather than the contentions of discontinuity, which Menon tries to refute by a largely
ahistorical exposure of the inconsistencies, selectivity, and disappointments associated
with the post-Cold War practice in humanitarian intervention/R2P.
What neither book confronts clearly is a core discontinuity bearing on the
diminished agency of military force as instruments of intervention. The anti-colonial wars
as well as the major instances of post-1945 intervention reveal a pattern of political
outcomes in which the weaker territorially based resistance side has mostly prevailed
over the stronger foreign intervening side. The Vietnam War should have taught this
lesson to American policymakers, but failed to do so, probably due to the militarized
bureaucracy that now governs in the United States.
Let me end with words of praise. Both of these books are fine works of
scholarship that inform and deepen our understanding of the formidable challenges
arising from the commission of atrocities in distant countries.

Syria illustrates the

particularly toxic mixture of a regime repeatedly committing atrocities and involuntarily
offering a haven of sorts for planning mega-terrorist operations against the West. In such
a situation it is not even clear whether responding to the acute humanitarian concern
posed by the Assad regime will have negative spillover effects on efforts to address the
ISIS threat. In such circumstances, an agonizing passivity still seems the least bad option
for Washington.

